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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature ofthe Case

This is an appeal from a conditional plea under I.C.R. 11. The state alleged that the
defendant had violated I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c). The Magistrate Court heard argument and found
that I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c) on its face and as applied to this case did not violate the requirements of
substantive due process embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Further, the Court heard argument on the defendant's proposed jury instruction as
to the defense of being a warehouseman as defined in I.C. § 54-1705(36). The Court denied the
requested instruction on the grounds that the Court believed the defendant would have to make a
showing of being employed in the pharmaceutical business to be entitled to it. The defendant
then entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of possessing a legend drug without a
prescription in violation ofI.C. § 54-1732(3)(c) while reserving his right to appeal the Court's
rulings and the Court found him guilty.
On appeal, the District Court found that I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c) was constitutional both on
its face and as applied. The District Court found that the Magistrate Court had erred in its
definition of the affirmative defense the defendant had requested, but upheld its denial based on
its own definition of that defense.
B.

Statement ofthe Facts

On May 12,2012, officers ofthe Post Falls Police Department arrested Nikolas Sherman
for allegedly possessing a legend drug in violation ofI.C. § 54-1732(3)(c). See Post Falls Police
Report No. 12PF08556.
1

On September 17, 2012, the Magistrate Court of Kootenai County held a hearing on Mr.
Sherman's Motions to Dismiss the charge against him on the grounds that it violated substantive
due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution both
as applied and on its face. Tr. p. 1, L. 1, 18-21. Mr. Sherman and the state stipulated to the entry
ofthe police report for purposes of the hearing to provide the Court with a factual basis for the as
applied challenge. Tr. p. 1, L. 22-25; p. 2, L.1-7. After hearing argument and reviewing the
defendant's memorandum and police report, the Court found the following in regards to the
facial challenge:
THE COURT: First of all, as to the - essentially the facial challenge, the rational basis, it
seems to me that that somewhat speaks for itself, given the issue of dealing with a
controlled substance. It seems to me that certain reasonable inferences from that are the
controlled and highly regulated nature of the substance in and of itself and that that,
frankly, is sufficient to meet the rational basis test.
Tr.p. 17,L.23-25;p. 18,L.1-5.
The Court then made the following findings as to the facts of the case:
THE COURT: The reasonable conclusion from [the police report] would be uh, that in
fact Mr. Sherman had improperly acquired; that is, based on the evidence available within
the police report that he had in fact stolen the prescription bottle out of the vehicle or I
suppose the house of the Gallegos', which would uh, make it, first of all, a petty [sic] theft
for obtaining the item. And secondly, potentially a burglary charge for entering either a
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vehicle or the house. I think there was some reference to perhaps qualification as to
whether - knowing whether the prescription was in the vehicle or not and then ultimately
the officers returning the prescription to the Gallegos.
Under those circumstances, urn, it seems to me that those are at least some other
circumstances. Not - not just the underlying facts, but also the connective facts, that uh,
Mr. Sherman was not particularly identifying the person that he was holding those for.
That is, it wasn't uh, a circumstance of saying these are the pills for my mother. I've just
picked them up at the pharmacy. Instead it was a reference to a female owner. There's a
male name on the pill bottle. Later a different male's name is given as the friend, but still
that doesn't match the pill bottle. And then of course the underlying circumstance where
the name on the pill bottle actually matches up to the Gallegos or a nearby neighbor and
no indication that that's somehow the friend that was referred to.
So in any event, I don't see the circumstances showing that the statute is overbroad as
described or alleged in the motion to dismiss.
Tr. p. 19, L. 19-25; p. 20, L. 1-24.
Then, on October 26, 2012, during a pretrial hearing, the Court agreed to review Mr.
Sherman's Motion to Reconsider his previous Motions to Dismiss. Tr. p. 23, L. 1; p. 24 L. 17-20.
The Court found that there was no "particular new or novel argument within the motion before
the Court as to the direct reconsideration of the Court's ruling" and so the Court declined to
revisit the issue. Tr. p. 24 L. 22-25; p. 25, L. 1. The Court found that within the motion to
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reconsider was essentially a request for a jury instruction. Tr. p. 25, L. 3-8. The Court invited
argument on that subject. Id. Defense counsel for Mr. Sherman requested an instruction that the
jury be told it would be a defense to the charge ifhe was found to fit the definition of a
warehouseman in I.C. § 54-1705. See Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Motion to Dismiss 1&
II; Tr. p. 25, L. 18-25; p. 26, L. 1-6. The Court found that:
THE COURT: In order for the Court to authorize that instruction, there would need to be
essentially a showing through the evidence to support that, that the defendant would be a
person who stores legend drugs for others. And it seems to, by the context of that, is in
the business of that, whether that would have to be shown truly for hire, if you will, that
is, for compensation, or other circumstances that might meet that. But I would see that
that type of showing would be necessary; absent that showing that uh, the Court would
not give such an instruction.
Tr. p. 27, L. 12-22.
Defense counsel for Mr. Sherman informed the Court that he would be unable to make
such a showing. Tr. p. 28, L. 12-15. The Court responded:
THE COURT: And just to be clear, I was trying to distinguish that whether he's truly
employed in that capacity. I suppose there could be some other circumstances where
someone uh, technically not as a matter of employment but is sort of in the business of,
whether for compensation or not, but in the business of holding such substances for
others.
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Tr. p. 28, L. 16-22.
Defense counsel for Mr. Shennan assured the Court that he was not engaged in economic
activity involving the holding of legend drugs. Tr. p. 28, L. 16-22. The Court then denied the
motion to reconsider and the proposed jury instruction. Tr. p. 29, L. 9-11. Mr. Shennan then
entered a conditional plea. Tr. p. 35, L. 5-12. The Court then sentenced Mr. Shennan but ordered
his sentence be stayed pending the resolution of his appeal pursuant to LC.R. 54.5. Tr. p. 35, L.
20-25; p. 37, L. 1-25; p. 38, L. 1-25; p. 39, L. 1-22. Mr. Shennan timely filed a notice of appeal
under LC.R. 54. 1(a), et.seq. from the judgment ofthe Court.
At the District Court the state never filed a brief. The District Court decided the matter
without hearing argument and issued a written opinion on April 26, 2013. The defendant filed a
timely notice of appeal from the District Court's decision under Idaho Appellate Rule 11(c)(10).
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Whether I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c) is on its face in violation of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

II.

Whether I.e. § 54-1732(3)( c) is as applied to the facts in this case in violation of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

III.

Whether the defendant was entitled to a jury instruction that it would be a defense
to a charge of possessing a prescription drug without a prescription under I.e. §
54-1732(3)(c) to merely be a person storing that legend drug for another and has
. no control over its disposition beside that storage.
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ARGUMENT
A.

Introduction
The Constitution "protects against the Government; it does not leave us at the mercy of

noblesse oblige. [The Supreme Court] would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely
because the Government promised to use it responsibly." United States v. Stevens, 130 S.Ct.
1577, 1591 (2010) citing Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457,473 (2001).
The Magistrate Court erred when it found I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c) constitutional in spite of the fact
that it criminalizes everyday behaviors of Idahoans which are without any reasonable
relationship to a legitimate state objective.
B. Standard for Review
An appellate court exercises free review over questions oflaw. Idaho v. Button, 134

Idaho 814 (Ct.App.2000); Powellv. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 125 (Ct. App. 1997).
e.

The I.e. § 54-1732(3)(c) violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution on its face.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
as well as Article I § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, guarantee every citizen ofldaho the right to be
free from arbitrary law. See Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Company v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 90

(1999); Smith v. Costello, 77 Idaho 205, 209 (1955). The right to be free from an arbitrary law
should not be confused with the overbreadth doctrine. "The overbreadth doctrine is aimed at
statutes which, though designed to prohibit legitimately regulated conduct, include within their
prohibitions constitutionally protected freedoms." State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 713 (2003).
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The two-part test for unconstitutional overbreadth asks (1) whether the statute regulates
constitutionally protected conduct, and (2) whether the statute precludes a significant amount of
that constitutionally protected conduct. !d. Substantive due process requires instead that "a
statute bear a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective." In re McNeely, 119
Idaho 182, 189 (Ct.App.1991). When dealing with legislation involving social or economic
interests, the Court assumes a deferential standard of review. See id. In this context, substantive
due process means "that legislation which deprives a person oflife, liberty, or property must
have a rational basis-that is, the reason for the deprivation may not be so inadequate that it may
be characterized as arbitrary." Id.
A prime example of arbitrary law was held unconstitutional in Smith. The plaintiff in
Smith had sued an officer who had shot his dog. Smith, 77 Idaho at 207. The officer relied on

I.e. § 37-1407 (1952) to justify the killing. !d. at 208.

The statute stated:

'* * * Any dog running at large in territory inhabited by deer, is hereby declared
to be a public nuisance and may be killed at such time by any game conservation
officer or other person entrusted with the enforcement of the game laws, without
criminal or civil liability. '
Id. The Idaho Supreme Court found that a dog was not a per se nuisance. Id. The Court further
found that many other jurisdictions had found statutes "authoriz[ing] the summary destruction of
dogs simply because said dogs might be running at large" unconstitutional. !d. The Court then
found that "territory inhabited by deer" if construed to mean "where deer might be found" would
"include the greater part of the state." Id. The Court held:
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[p ]olice regulations cannot arbitrarily and without any sufficient reason authorize
the killing or wounding of animals belonging to another. The legislature cannot
declare something to be a nuisance which is not one in fact or per se; and to
declare that a dog running at large in territory inhabited by deer is a public
nuisance, without more, is an arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional
regulation.

Id. at 209.
The rational basis test was first developed in Williamson v. Lee Optical, Co., 348 U.S.
483,487-8 (1955). In that case, the Court held,
[t]he Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases.
But it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and
disadvantages of the new requirement. It appears that in many cases the optician
can easily supply the new frames or new lenses without reference to the old
written prescription. It also appears that many written prescriptions contain no
directive data in regard to fitting spectacles to the face. But in some cases the
directions contained in the prescription are essential, if the glasses are to be fitted
so as to correct the particular defects of vision or alleviate the eye condition. The
legislature might have concluded that the frequency of occasions when a
prescription is necessary was sufficient to justify this regulation of the fitting of
eyeglasses. Likewise, when it is necessary to duplicate a lens, a written
prescription mayor may not be necessary. But the legislature might have
concluded that one was needed often enough to require one in every case. Or the
legislature may have concluded that eye examinations were so critical, not only
for correction of vision but also for detection of latent ailments or diseases, that
every change in frames and every duplication of a lens should be accompanied by
a prescription from a medical expert. To be sure, the present law does not require
a new examination of the eyes every time the frames are changed or the lenses
duplicated. For if the old prescription is on file with the optician, he can go ahead
and make the new fitting or duplicate the lenses. But the law need not be in every
respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that
there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.

The Court thereby held constitutional a law which was clearly both over and underinclusive in its
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scope. The arbitrariness of the law, however, was not so great in the eyes of the Court that it
would violate the Constitution.
Since Lee Optical, the Supreme Court has considered a variety of statutes for possible
violations ofthe rational basis test.
In Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238,248-9 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld a regulation
requiring members of a police force in New York to have a certain haircut. While upholding the
regulation, the Court suggested the same law could not be applied to the general public. Id. As
Justice Powell stated in concurrence, "This process of analysis justifies the application of a
reasonable regulation to a uniformed police force that would be an impermissible intrusion upon
liberty in a different context." Id.
In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982), Justice Brennan in a concurring
opinion joined by three other justices, found that an Illinois statute that dismissed claims unless a
hearing was held within 120 days regardless of the cause of the delay was irrational though the
majority did not reach that claim in granting the petitioner relief. Justice Brennan described
rational basis review as "not a toothless [standard]." Id. at 439 quoting Schweiker v. Wilson, 450
U.S. 221,230 (1981). The justice further acknowledged that "[n]o bright line divides the merely
foolish from the arbitrary law," but all the same laws "must "rationally advanc[e] a reasonable
and identifiable govemmental objective." Id. at 439-40, quoting Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 235,243
(dissenting opinion). Justice Brennan found:
[I]t is possible that the Illinois Supreme Court meant to suggest that the deadline
contained in' 858(b) can be justified as a means of thinning out the
Commission's caseload, with the aim of encouraging the Commission to convene

10

timely hearings. This rationale, however, suffers from the defect outlined above: it
draws an arbitrary line between otherwise identical claims. In any event, the
State's method of furthering this purpose-if this was in fact the legislative end-has
so speculative and attenuated a connection to its goal as to amount to arbitrary
action. The State's rationale must be something more than the exercise of a
strained imagination; while the connection between means and ends need not be
precise, it, at the least, must have some objective basis. That is not so here.
Id. at 442.
In City o/Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985), the

Supreme Court struck down an ordinance requiring a home for the mentally disabled to seek a
special use permit. The Court found no legitimate reason for the ordinance, dismissing private
biases, vague, undifferentiated fears, an unjustified claim of a different or special hazard posed
by the home, and an unjustified claim that some different density requirement should apply to
such a home. Id. at 448-450. The Court concluded that the City had failed to give a rational
reason justifying its ordinance:
In the courts below the city also urged that the ordinance is aimed at avoiding
concentration of population and at lessening congestion of the streets. These
concerns obviously fail to explain why apartment houses, fraternity and sorority
houses, hospitals and the like, may freely locate in the area without a permit. So,
too, the expressed worry about fire hazards, the serenity of the neighborhood, and
the avoidance of danger to other residents fail rationally to justify singling out a
home such as 201 Featherston for the special use permit, yet imposing no such
restrictions on the many other uses freely permitted in the neighborhood.

Id. at 44.
In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the Court struck down a statute criminalizing

sodomy in the state of Texas. The Court in Lawrence took note of the direct and indirect
penalties and stigma attached to a violation of the law. Id. at 575. The Court held
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[t]he petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot
demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual
conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them
the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.
"It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which
the government may not enter." The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state
interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual.

Id. quoting Planned Parenthood a/Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992).
Lastly, in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) the Supreme Court upheld a legislative act
aimed at precisely the same issue as confronted the Idaho Legislature when it passed I.e. § 541732(3)(c)- the improper use and abuse of prescription medications. The petitioners in the case
challenged a law requiring a database to be created with the government listing patients, their
doctors, and what medications they had been prescribed. Id. at 591. The petitioners alleged that
the system infringed on privacy and presented evidence than some patients stop taking required
medicine for fear of being labeled drug addicts. Id. at 595. In that case the Court found
The New York statute challenged in this case represents a considered attempt to
deal with such a problem. It is manifestly the product of an orderly and rational
legislative decision. It was recommended by a specially appointed commission
which held extensive hearings on the proposed legislation, and drew on
experience with similar programs in other States. There surely was nothing
unreasonable in the assumption that the patient-identification requirement might
aid in the enforcement of laws designed to minimize the misuse of dangerous
drugs. For the requirement could reasonably be expected to have a deterrent effect
on potential violators as well as to aid in the detection or investigation of specific
instances of apparent abuse. At the very least, it would seem clear that the State's
vital interest in controlling the distribution of dangerous drugs would support a
decision to experiment with new techniques for control. For if an experiment fails
if in this case experience teaches that the patient-identification requirement results
in the foolish expenditure of funds to acquire a mountain of useless information
the legislative process remains available to terminate the unwise experiment. It
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follows that the legislature's enactment of the patient-identification requirement
was a reasonable exercise of New York's broad police powers. The District
Court's finding that the necessity for the requirement had not been proved is not,
therefore, a sufficient reason for holding the statutory requirement
unconstitutional. (footnotes omitted).

Id. at 597-98.
In the case at bar, the statute at issue must be found irrational and arbitrary in its scope.
I.C. § 54-1732 in relevant part states:
(3) The following acts, or the failure to act, and the causing of any such act or
failure are unlawful;
(c) The possession or use of a legend drug or a precursor by any person unless
such person obtains such drug on the prescription or drug order of a practitioner.
Any person guilty of violating this paragraph shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
and upon conviction thereof shall be incarcerated in the county jail for a term not
to exceed one (1) year, or punished by a fine of not more than one thousand
dollars ($1,000) or by both such fine and incarceration.
Possession is defined as either knowledge of an object's presence and physical control or power
and intent to control the object. State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 241 (1999). I.C. § 54-1705
defines person as "an individual, corporation, partnership, association or any other legal entity."
Legend drug is defined as:
a drug which, under federal law is required, prior to being dispensed or delivered,
to be labeled with one (1) of the following statements:
(a) "Caution: Federal law prohibits dispensing without a prescription"; or
(b) "Rx Only"; or

(c) "Caution: Federal law restricts this drug to use by or on the order of a licensed
veterinarian" ;
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or a drug which is required by any applicable federal or state law or regulation to
be dispensed on prescription only or is restricted to use by practitioners only.

Drug is defined as:
(a) Articles recognized as drugs in the official United States Pharmacopoeia,
official National Formulary, official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia, other drug
compendia or any supplement to any of them;
(b) Articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or
prevention of disease in man or other animal;
(c) Articles, other than food, intended to affect the structure or any function of the
body of man or other animals; and
(d) Articles intended for use as a component of any articles specified in paragraph
(a), (b) or (c) ofthis subsection.

Precursor is defined as:
a substance, other than a legend drug which is an immediate chemical
intermediate that can be processed or synthesized into a legend drug, and is used
or produced primarily for use in the manufacture of a legend drug by persons
other than persons licensed to manufacture such legend drugs by the Idaho board
of pharmacy, registered by the state board of health and welfare, or licensed to
practice pharmacy by the Idaho board of pharmacy.

Practitioner is defined "as a person licensed in this state and permitted by such license to
dispense, conduct research with respect to or administer drugs in the course of professional
practice or research in this state." Prescription drug order "means a lawful written or verbal
order of a practitioner for a drug or device for an ultimate user of the drug or device, issued and
signed by a practitioner, or an order transmitted verbally from a practitioner or the practitioner's
agent to a pharmacist in a pharmacy, or transmitted verbally from a practitioner and immediately
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reduced to writing by a licensed practical nurse or licensed professional nurse in an institutional
facility for a patient or resident of such facility."
Finally, I.e. § 54-1734 lists exceptions to I.e. § 54-1732(3)( c). It states in relevant part:
The provisions of this chapter pertaining to the sale of prescription drugs are not
applicable:

(2) To the possession of legend drugs by such persons or their agents or
employees for such use:
(a) Pharmacists;
(b) Practitioners;
(c) Persons who procure legend drugs for handling by or under the supervision of
pharmacists or practitioners employed by them, or for the purpose of lawful
research, teaching, or testing, and not for resale;
(d) Hospitals and other institutions which procure legend drugs for lawful
administration by practitioners;
( e) Manufacturers and wholesalers;
(f) Carriers and warehousemen.

No other exceptions exist anywhere within the Act. I.C. § 54-1705 defines pharmacist as "an
individual licensed by this state to engage in the practice of pharmacy or a pharmacist licensed in
another state who is registered by the board of pharmacy to engage in the practice of
telepharmacy across state lines." Practitioner is defined "as a person licensed in this state and
permitted by such license to dispense, conduct research with respect to or administer drugs in the
course of professional practice or research in this state." Manufacturer is defined as "a person
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who by compounding, cultivating, harvesting, mixing or other process, produces or prepares
legend drugs, and includes persons who prepare such drugs in dosage forms by mixing,
compounding, encapsulating, entableting, or other process, or who packages or repackages such
drugs, but does not include pharmacists or practitioners in the practice of their profession."
Wholesaler is defined as "a person engaged in the business of distributing legend drugs that he
himself has not produced or prepared, to persons included in any of the classes named in
subsection (2)(a) through (f) of section 54-1734, Idaho Code." Warehouseman is defined as "a
person who stores legend drugs for others and who has no control over the disposition of such
drugs except for the purpose of such storage."
The Magistrate further defined a warehouseman as one employed in a capacity where he
handles and stores prescription medications. Tr. p. 28, L. 16-22. The District Court overruled
this holding, but instead defined the warehouseman as a person who stores legend drugs for
others who are the legal owners of those drugs. See Decision on Appeal from Magistrate
Division of District Court, p. 9 (April 26, 2013).
"Agency" is the relationship resulting from the manifestation of consent by one to
another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control and consent by the other so
to act. Gorton v. Doty, 57 Idaho 792, 69 P.2d 136, 139 (1937).
In sum, the Act criminalizes possession of prescription drugs and their precursors unless

those drugs were prescribed specifically to the person in possession, except where the above
referenced narrow exceptions apply. The absurdity of the law is apparent on its face. While the
state has a legitimate interest in stopping the misuse and abuse of prescription drugs, the state
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had no interest in preventing care giving or the ordinary actions that take place every day which
constitute a violation of this law. To justify this law the state would need show that the
population of the state of Idaho, aside from those employed in the pharmaceutical industry, is so
disposed as to misuse and abuse any medication of which it comes into possession. To limit the
legal possession of medication to the individual prescribed and pharmaceutical employees is
utterly irrational.
Under I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c) only practitioners or their agents can administer medication to
invalids, children, and animals. Not only are family members violating the law when they pick
up a loved one's prescription from the pharmacy, but under the law, so are the pharmacist and
the person prescribed for having "caused" the violation.
I.C. § 54-1734 cannot be read to include caregivers and parents in the immunity it grants.
A parent is not an agent of a practitioner. While the parent may perform a task the practitioner is
licensed to do, the practitioner is the one operating on the parent's child by contract. The
practitioner is not providing authority to the parent to administer medications or controlling how
they administer them. Nor is the parent "representing" the practitioner. Certainly, no court
would recognize a right on the behalf ofthe child to sue a practitioner for a misadministration of
a prescription drug by a parent.
Further, the parent has the right to raise their child. While no particular right to care for a
sick child has ever been recognized as being a right contained in the Fourteenth Amendment, it
should be enough to acknowledge that the government has no legitimate purpose criminalizing
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perfectly natural parental behaviors that have existed before, and will continue to exist long after,
the government. As the Supreme Court stated in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923):
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus
guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included
things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates
of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
(citations omitted).

The Idaho Constitution also protects these rights under Article I § 1. The Idaho Legislature has
further acknowledged the importance of care in I.C. § 16-1602(2S)(a). That subsection states:
Who is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other
care or control necessary for his well-being because of the conduct or omission of
his parents, guardian or other custodian or their neglect or refusal to provide them;
however, no child whose parent or guardian chooses for such child treatment by
prayers through spiritual means alone in lieu of medical treatment shall be
deemed for that reason alone to be neglected or lack parental care necessary for
his health and well-being, but this subsection shall not prevent the court from
acting pursuant to section 16-1627, Idaho Code ...

This language suggests that the Idaho Legislature assumes that the care given by a parent to a
child is not an area in which the government may interfere where it is being given in good faith.
Certainly, without this language, no First Amendment violation could exist, as the statute
regulates conduct without reference to religion. See Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v.Smith,.494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Legislature therefore was
acknowledging the importance and inviolability of parent-child care.
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While never ascribed a higher level of protection than rational basis review, the act of
caring for another is not reasonably encompassed by the objectives of the government in passing
I.e. § 54-1732(3)(c). Even if the government has a legitimate reason to keep track of
prescription medication and to invade the privacy of the doctor-patient relationship, it does not
have any justification for criminalizing acts that are crucial to providing care. To state otherwise
is to accept that no parent, family member, or friend may ever again assist in the medicationrelated aspects of care. It is highly unlikely that the health care industry is ready or willing to
shoulder that burden.
Further, it is absurd for the government to surmise that the only people who can be
trusted not to misuse, abuse, or deal illegally in prescription drugs are doctors, pharmacists,
warehousemen, and patients. The groups singled out to be immune from I.C. § 54-1732 by I.C.
§ 54-1734 have no reason to be less likely to pilfer and abuse medication than the friends and
family of a patient. Prescription drug abuse is likely to have similar consequences for the
employment of the abuser as stealing medication will have for a doctor. A friend or family
member actually has the additional safeguard of caring about the person whose prescription it is.
The law assumes that there may be people who will not be tempted, due to the conditions of their
employment, not to misuse medications they hold for another, while also assuming that every
other person cannot be trusted. Under this theory, the government could outlaw the storage of
any potentially dangerous item. Guns, nonprescription drugs, knives, the precursors of bombs
such as fertilizers, particularly heavy books, all of these things could be confined to the
possession of their immediate owners because the government deems the rest of mankind
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untrustworthy. Such thinking is irrational and has no place in our society. I.e. § 54-1732 treats
prescription drugs like contraband, and leaves the liberties of the people no breathing room.
Therefore, the law is absurd.
The Court should not accept any argument by the state that this law will be implemented
in a constitutional way. As Chief Justice Roberts wrote in Stevens, 130 S.Ct. at 1591 citing
Whitman 531 U.S. at 473, the Court "would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely
because the Government promised to use it responsibly." The misuse of I.e. § 54-1732 is easy
to imagine: a husband gets medication for his wife and is pulled over for a driving infraction, the
officer sees he has a history of arrests for possession of a controlled substance and writes him a
ticket for violating I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c). He has no defense: the statute does indeed criminalize
the possession that took place. However, this conduct is in no way rationally related to the
government'sobjective of preventing the husband from abusing or misusing the medication
except in the most extremely attenuated fashion. Therefore, this Court should find I.C. § 541732(3)(c) unconstitutional.

II.
A. Introduction
The District Court erred in not finding that I.C. § 54-1732 is unconstitutional as applied
to the facts of this case. The Court reviewed the statements made by the defendant and the
Magistrate's findings and found no issue with the application of the statute. Criminalizing the
act of temporarily possessing the property of another goes beyond the boundaries of rationality
and this Court should find I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c) unconstitutional as applied to this case.
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B.

Standard of Review
On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, this Court

reviews that decision directly and examines the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the
magistrate's conclusions oflaw follow from those findings. Lasser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672
(2008); State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711 (Ct. App. 2008). An appellate court exercises free

review over questions oflaw. Powell, 130 Idaho at 125.
e.

I.e. § 54-1732(3)(c) violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution as applied to the facts of this case.
As argued above, the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and

Article I § 13 of the Idaho Constitution require that the laws passed by state legislatures be
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. In the case at bar, the Magistrate Court
received a police report and was told these were the facts in the case. The Court found that the
defendant merely possessed the legend drugs. Even though the Court found that the defendant
was knowingly in possession of stolen medication, the problem remains that the law he was
actually charged with does not distinguish between the defendant's proffered defense- that he
had been given the medication by a friend to store while they played Frisbee golf and had not yet
returned it- and the Court's finding that he likely stole it. The defendant's defense is no defense
under I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c). As applied, I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c) seeks to punish the defendant for
merely possessing a drug for which he had no prescription. How he came into possession is
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immaterial so long as no practitioner prescribed him the medication and he does not fall into one
of the exceptions under I.e. § 54-1734.
This case highlights the problem with statutes that criminalize behavior not reasonably
related to their objective. Were the defendant to tell a jury that his friend gave him a bottle to
hold while they played Frisbee golfhe would only convict himself. I.e. § 54-1732(3)(c) makes
it a crime to merely possess another's prescription drug unless you are prescribed it or are
immune under I.C. § 54-1734. I.C. § 54-1734 specifically grants immunity to carriers and
warehousemen, whose only job would be to store and carry medications that they themselves are
not prescribed. There is no rational basis to punish the defendant for conduct allowed a
warehouseman or a patient.
The District Court expanded the finding of the Magistrate by holding that it was unlawful
for the defendant to possess stolen medication regardless of whether he knew it to be stolen.
This holding is in conflict with I.C. § 18-114, State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924 (1993), and the text of
the statute. This is likely because possession of stolen property is already a violation of the law.

See I.C. § 18-2403. However, as there are no criminal statutes in Idaho that do not at least
require criminal negligence, and where no mental element is specified the requirements is
general intent, and general intent at least requires that the person be conscious of the unlawful
act, the District Court's ruling is in error. See Fox, 124 Idaho at 926. That is all beside the point
because the law itself makes no distinction between the person the warehouseman received the
drug from or whether the person is aware of and holding it for its true owner.
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III.
A.

Introduction
If the District Court did not err in finding that I.C. § 54-1732(3)( c) is constitutional, then

the Court erred in upholding the Magistrate's refusal of the defendant's proposed jury instruction
providing an affinnative defense to one merely storing the medication of another. The defendant
is not required to produce sufficient evidence to prove the legal possession of the medication by
the person from whom he received it.
B.

Standard of Review
On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, this Court

reviews that decision directly and examines the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the
magistrate's conclusions oflaw follow from those findings. Losser, 145 Idaho at 672; DeWitt, 145
Idaho at 711. An appellate court exercises free review over questions oflaw. Powell, 130 Idaho
at 125.
C.

The defendant was entitled to his proposed jury instruction.
As explained above, I.C. § 54-1732(3)( c) makes it illegal for anyone to possess a drug

they were not prescribed by a doctor. I.C. § 54-1734 provides immunity to "warehousemen and
carriers." The concept of a carrier is not defined by the Act, but I.e. § 54-1705 defines a
warehouseman as:
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a person who stores legend drugs for others and who has no control over the
disposition of such drugs except for the purpose of such storage.

The defendant requested an instruction to the jury that it would be a defense ifhe was
storing the legend drug for another and had no control over the disposition of the drug except for
the purpose of such storage. The state successfully argued to the Magistrate Court that the text
implied a person who is employed by an entity that stores medications. This interpretation of the
text is wrong. When the legislature defines a word for the purposes of a law, it is not for the
jUdiciary to insert additional language in order to serve a purpose never stated by the legislature.

See Williams v. State, 153 Idaho 380, 283 P.3d 127, 137 (Ct.App.2012). While one may infer
from the list of exemptions in I.e. § 54-1734 that the legislature was only intending to grant
immunity to those employed in the pharmaceutical industry, the legislature never went so far as
to say so. Under the Rule of Lenity, the statute must be strictly construed. See State v. Jones,
151 Idaho 943, 947 (Ct.App.20ll). Thus, the District Court was correct to overrule the
Magistrate's holding.
However, the District Court erred in requiring that the defendant be able to show lawful
ownership of the drug by the person from whom he received it. The statute contains no such
limitation. Further, even if this Court were to find it appropriate for the judiciary to place a
"lawful ownership" element within the immunity granted by the legislature, the defendant should
only need to produce evidence that he believed the person he received the drug from had lawful
ownership, and the burden to persuade the jury that he did not believe that and knew it was not
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the property of the person they received it from should be on the state. State v. Rogers, 30 Idaho
259,271 (1917).
CONCLUSION
The case before this Court requires it to determine how broadly the legislature may
partially criminalize the possession of an item which is legally in the possession of the vast
majority of Idahoans. It is no exaggeration to say that almost every Idahoan will corne legally
into possession of a prescription drug during the course of a year. It is further no exaggeration to
say that almost every Idahoan will corne illegally into possession of a prescription drug during
the course of a year. The reason for this is the absurd scope of I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c). This Court
should find that I.C. § 54-1732(3)( c) is unconstitutional on its face or as applied in this case. If
this Court does not find that the statute is unconstitutional, it should allow the defendant's
requested affirmative defense be given to the jury.
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